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NOTES AND COMMENT
In accordance with this rule, the order of the court below,
which authorized the erection of a gasoline station, was affirmed as
modified by a direction that when the circumstances become so
changed by the development of the city that the property is reason-
ably susceptible of being applied to business uses, then, upon the
application of the authorities or anyone interested, the gasoline sta-
tion must be removed.
Discussing the constitutionality of zoning laws, the court said:
"Law is applied to facts, and as the facts change in the
process of time the law adapts itself accordingly. That
which may be unconstitutional today may be legal years
hence * * *." 17
This language, noble though it be, was mere dicta since the con-
stitutionality 18 of zoning restrictions was not in issue in this case.
Whether it is evidence of a growing tendency for the formulation of
a realist jurisprudence 19 remains to be seen. Meanwhile, pity the
fact that such words are only dicta instead of forming a part
of a decision upholding the constitutionality of some great social
enactment.
ALBERT SCHLEFER.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF DAMAGES FOR FRIGHT
IN NEW YORK.
The question as to whether damages are recoverable for fright
and for nervous shock has been the subject of legal controversy
since 1888 when the Court in Victorian Railways Cofnfnrs. v.
Coultas I decided that there could be no recovery for damages re-
sulting from fright. Before many years had passed the doctrine of
that case was practically overruled,2 and in 1925 the case of Ham-
brook v. Stokes Bros. Ltd.3 liberally extended the doctrine of re-
covery of damages for fright as it then existed in England.
" Supra note 3 at 82, 177 N. E. at 315.
"3 For a discussion of the constitutionality of zoning laws, see Weisman,
Zoning Administration i New York City, supra note 13.
"Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44 HARv. L.
REv. 697.
1 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888).
2 Dilieu v. White, 2 K. B. 669 (1901).
1 K. B. 141 (1925). The plaintiff was allowed to recover for the death
of his wife brought about by reason of the severe shock she suffered in wit-
nessing the defendant's motor lorry negligently strike her daughter. It was
said plaintiff could recover, although his wife had not been shocked by a fear
of injury to herself, provided shock resulted from what she saw or realized,
rather than that which someone told her.
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In the United States the cases which involve this question have
resulted in varied determinations 4 and the subject has been treated
extensively by the foremost legal writers in the field of torts.5
In New York State, Mitchell v. Rochester Railway 6 deciding
that damages could not be recovered for fright or for injuries re-
sulting therefrom laid down a doctrine representative of that fol-
lowed by the state in all such cases. Although the decision has been
challenged 7 it has never been overruled.
In a case 8 recently decided by the Court of Appeals, plaintiff's
automobile in which his testatrix was a passenger collided with an
automobile operated by the defendant. Damage to the cars was
slight and there is nothing in the record to evidence physical injury
at the time of the collision. However, plaintiff's testatrix stepped
out of the car and while obtaining name and license number fainted;
she fell to the sidewalk striking her head, and died within twenty
minutes due to a fractured skull. A judgment of $5,000 in favor of
the plaintiff was affirmed in the Appellate Division 9 and the follow-
ing question certified to the Court of Appeals:
"Was it error for the trial court to refuse defendant's request to
charge that if the jury finds that the deceased at the time of the
collision sustained only shock or fright without physical injury, they
must find for the defendant?"
The judgment was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals and the question certified answered in the negative. Recovery
in this case seems to have been based on the principle that there
was a physical impact concurrent with the shock or fright, for the
court said, "The injury was not confined to fright. The fright was
only a link in the chain of causation between collision and fractured
"Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897);
Ewing v. Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40, 23 Atl. 340 (1892). (Recov-
ery was denied.) Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Calif. 298, 176 Pac. 440, aff'd, 189
Pac. 798 (1918) ; Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 Atl. 688 (1909). (Recov-
ery was permitted.)
.Throckmorton, Damages for Fright (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 260;
Wilson, The New York Ride as to Nervous Shock (1926) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 512.
See also, 11 A. L. R. 1119, 23 A. L. R. 361, 40 A. L. R. 983, 44 A. L. R. 428,
56 A. L. R. 657.
'151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354, 34 L. R. A. 781, 56 Am. St. Rep. 604 (1896).
Plaintiff while awaiting one of defendant's cars was severely frightened and
later suffered a miscarriage, by reason of another of defendant's horse-cars
coming so close to her that she stood between the horses' heads when they
finally were halted.
" Throckmorton, supra note 5; see Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 125 Misc.
835, 836, 211 N. Y. Supp. 582, 583 (1925). "There seems to be no reason for
the rule announced in the Mitchell case. It is said that the rule was adopted
as one of public policy; or as one of necessity to avoid the perpetration of
fraud. Whatever may have been the prevailing conditions when this rule was
announced, there is now no need of it on the score of public policy or
necessity."
'Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931).
'232 App. Div. 720, 247 N. Y. Supp. 908 (4th Dept. 1931). Two judges
dissented.
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skull. The collision itself, the consequent jar to the passengers in
the car, was a battery and an invasion of their legal right. Their
cause of action was complete when they suffered consequent
damages."
It appears that the court has taken a progressive step to modify
the rule laid down in the Mitchell case.' 0 There are cases in this
state which allow a recovery of damages for fright where it has been
proven that there were concurrent physical injuries 11 and in fact
there is one case in which damages were recovered although the facts
indicate that the injuries were the direct result of fright and not
concurrent therewith.' 2  However, the instant case seems to stand
alone in predicating a recovery on the principle of concurrent physi-
cal impact as distinguished from concurrent physical injury.
In Lehman v. Brooklyn City Ry.'3 where a woman frightened
by a runaway horse suffered a miscarriage allegedly due to the fright,
recovery was denied on the ground that neither precedent nor author-
ity constituted a basis for the theory of action.
The next case involving this question was the celebrated
Mitchell v. Rochester R. R.' 4 decided in 1896. Ten years later in
Newton v. N. Y., N. H. and H. R. R. Co.,' 5 the plaintiff, a passengser
in defendant's train, although jarred forward in his seat by the force
of a collision, was at the time physically uninjured. And because he
failed to show any concurrent physical injury he was precluded from
recovering damages for the nervous condition which subsequently
developed. The facts are peculiarly in point with those of the instant
case '0 and if the court had then employed the principle of physical
impact rather than that of physical injury, the decision would prob-
ably have been in favor of the plaintiff.
In Hack v. Dady 17 the court ruled that recovery of damages for
"Supra note 6.
Jones v. B'klyn Heights Ry. Co., 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N. Y. Supp. 914
(2d Dept. 1897); O'Flaherty v. Nassau Electric Ry. Co., 165 N. Y. 624, 59
N. E. 1128 (1900), aff'g, 34 App. Div. 74, 54 N. Y. Supp. 96 (1898); Wood
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 179 N. Y. 557, 71 N. E. 1142, aff'g, 83 App. Div.
604, 82 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1903) ; Lofink v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 10Z
App. Div. 275, 92 N. Y. Supp. 386, 16 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 68 (2d Dept. 1905);
Mundy v. Levy Bros. Realty Co., 184 App. Div. 467, 170 N. Y. Supp. 994 (2d
Dept. 1918); Tracy v. Hotel Wellington Corp., 188 App. Div. 923, 176 N. Y.
Supp. 923, aff'g, 175 N. Y. Supp. 100 (2d Dept. 1919).
'Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39(1st Dept. 1914).
47 Hun 355 (N. Y. 1888).
"Supra note 6.
106 App. Div. 415, 94 N. Y. Supp. 825 (1st Dept. 1905)., Dissenting
opinion by Laughlin, J.
' Supra note 8.
17134 App. Div. 253, 118 N. Y. Supp. 906 (2d Dept. 1909), second trial;
142 App. Div. 510. 127 N. Y. Supp. 22, also 142 App. Div. 948, 127 N. Y. Supp.
26 (2d Dept. 1911). The plaintiff, a mother, sustained slight burns by reason
of molten lead cast upon her from the explosion of defendant's lead heater and
she alleged that several subsequent miscarriages were due to the fright pre-
viously experienced.
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fright was not justified unless it could be established that slight
physical injuries sustained concurrent with the fright were the
ultimate cause of the plaintiff's subsequent physical derangements.
Under the doctrine of this case physical injuries concurrent with
fright are not always sufficient to warrant a recovery for damages
resulting from the fright. The plaintiff was denied a recovery of
damages for mental suffering sustained by his wife in the case of
Cook v. Village of Mohawk -1 because the physical ills of the wife,
which were aggravated by the mental fear, had not arisen from the
same circumstances.
In a comparatively recent case, O'Brien v. Moss,19 plaintiff was
denied recovery of damages allegedly the result of fright, on the
grounds that the record was entirely devoid of proof of any physical
injury to which the later sufferings could be traced. Mental suffering
occasioned by a delayed telegram announcing a brother's death 20 or
because of the tender of an erroneously dated cremation certificate 21
do not afford any basis for the allowance of pecuniary damages.
Nor has the doctrine of the Mitchell case 22 any application in actions
involving wilful tort.2 3  However, recovery of damages for fright
was allowed in Jones v. B'klyn Heights R. R. Co.,24 where the pres-
ence of physical injury authorized the jury to find that damages
resulted; and fear as a concomitant element did not destroy the right
of action but rather enhanced the damages. An electric shock, as in
the case of O'Flaherty v. Nassau Electric R. R. Co.25 is such an
accompanying physical injury as would furnish the basis for a recov-
ery of damages for fright. A profound distinction is to be made
between ordinary mental molestation and a severe jolting and jarring
associated with physical injury. This was clearly pointed out in
-207 N. Y. 311, 100 N. E. 815 (1913), rev'g, 143 App. Div. 961, 128
N. Y. Supp. 1119 (1911).
"9220 App. Div. 464, 221 N. Y. Supp. 621 (4th Dept. 1927). Plaintiff's
wife suffered miscarriage allegedly due to fright sustained when defendant's
truck negligently backed into the automobile in which she was a passenger.
Curtin v. W. U. Tel. Co., 13 App. Div. 253 (lst Dept. 1897).
'Stahl v. Necker, Inc., 184 App. Div. 85, 171 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st
Dept. 1918).
'Supra note 6.
Preiser v. Weilandt, 48 App. Div. 569, 62 N. Y. Supp. 890 (2d Dept.
1900); Williams v. Underhill, 63 App. Div. 223, 71 N. Y. Supp. 291 (lst Dept.
1901); Beck v. Libraro, 220 App. Div. 547, 221 N. Y. Supp. 737 (2d Dept.
1927).
'23 App. Div. 141, 48 N. Y. Supp. 914 (2d Dept. 1897). A bulb fell from
ceiling of one of defendant's cars striking the plaintiff, a passenger, allegedly
on the head and abdomen and there was evidence of an immediate injury
substantiating her grounds for recovery of damages for a miscarriage due to
the blow and the fright.
165 N. Y. 624, 59 N. E. 1128 (1900), aff'g, 34 App. Div. 74, 54 N. Y.
Supp. 96 (1898).
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Wood v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R. Co., 26 although actual physical
impact was lacking in the facts.
In Lofink v. Interborough Rapid Transit Company 27 evidence
and testimony of bodily pain justified a recovery for an abnormal
nervous condition produced in the plaintiff as the result of having
been thrown to the floor of defendant's train when a collision
occurred. It is interesting to compare this case with Newton v.
N. Y., N. H. and H. R. R. Co.2' and both cases centered upon the
question of whether there was physical injury at the time of the
accident.
The allowance of a recovery in Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co.29
does not follow the principles of preceding cases because the damages
were the result of fright unaccompanied by physical injuries. The
cases cited 30 therein do not support the statement of the court 31
because in those cases fright was attended by concurrent physical
injuries whereas, in the case then at bar, fright preceded the injuries
and to argue reversely, if we are to allow damages for the results of
fright unaccompanied by physical injuries, then we are in effect
granting that an action lies for fright; damages are to depend upon
the resulting physical injuries and the logic of the Mitchell case would
be completely overruled.
32
In Mundy v. Levy Bros. Realty Co. 33 the disturbance of the
plaintiff's support was a sufficient link in the chain of causation
between negligence and injury, to warrant a recovery for the con-
current fright. Minor bruises, in addition to the fright sustained by
the plaintiff, substantiated a recovery for both in the case of Tracy v.
Hotel Wellington Corp.34
179 N. Y. 557, 71 N. E. 1142, aff'g, 83 App. Div. 604, 82 N. Y. Supp. 160
(1903). Plaintiff thrown against seat of wagon when train of defendant negli-
gently approached crossing causing plaintiff's horse to run wild. Immediately
thereafter plaintiff spat blood and later developed tuberculosis.
' 102 App. Div. 275, 92 N. Y. Supp. 386, 16 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 68 (2d Dept.
1905).
'Supra note 15.
' Supra note 12. The plaintiff seeing her children descending in an un-
attended elevator fainted, fell into the elevator shaft and incurred injuries. It
was contended that plaintiff was not entitled to damages because her injuries
were solely the result of fright.
'0 Jones v. B'klyn Hgts. Ry. Co., supra note 24; Wood v. N. Y. C. &.
H. R. R. Co., supra note 26.
162 App. Div. 791, 792, 793, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39, 40 (1st Dept. 1914).
"For fright alone, unconnected with physical injury, it is true that no recovery
can be had, but when the fright results in an actual physical injury a different
rule prevails," citing cases supra note 30.
' Supra note 6, p. 109. "Assuming that fright cannot form the basis of an
action it is obvious that no recovery can be had for injuries resulting there-
from."
' 184 App. Div. 467, 170 N. Y. Supp. 994 (2d Dept. 1918). Plaintiff fell
to ground when 150-pound elevator door fell near her and she sustained injuries
from the fall and from the concurrent fright.
, 188 App. Div. 923, 176 N. Y. Supp. 923, aff'g, 175 N. Y. Supp. 100 (2d
Dept. 1919), Lehman, J., dissented.
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The instant case,3 5 in promulgating the principle that damages
may be recovered for fright and its effects if there is a physical
impact concurrent with the fright, has taken a progressive and a
logical step in the direction of modifying the doctrine of the Mitchell
case. The effect of the decision in actions which may arise in the
future will always be limited by a determination of whether the
injuries are the immediate and evident result of the defendant's lack
of care. It would be even a more reasonable and a more just rule if,
regardless of physical injuries or physical impact, fright and shock
were treated as links in the chain of causation between the wrongful
act and the injury.3 6
PHILIP V. MANNING, JR.
LIABILITY OF LANDLORD IN TORT FOR INJURIES SUFFERED ON
LEASED PREMISES-PROPOSED STATUTORY CHANGE.
It has been remarked that under present rules of law a tenant
has two rights: first, to sign the lease, and second, to pay the rent.
This banter is more caustic than witty, and in a sense portrays the
notorious situation of unbalance existing in the law of Landlord and
Tenant. The heritage of ancient conditions is a law of real property
which, in modern urban life, creates situations which are patently
unfair to the lessee. Slowly and gradually are the more glaring
inequities being eradicated.' It is only a matter of seventy years
Supra note 8.2 Supra note 5, Throckmorton, 34 HARv. L. REv., p. 268, "The first
reason" (namely, p. 265, that fright caused by negligence is not itself a cause
of action none of its consequences can give a cause of action) "assigned for
denying recovery for nervous shock resulting from fright may therefore be
dismissed with the statement that while it is true no recovery may be had for
mere fright for want of a physical injury yet physical injury resulting from a
wrongful act is actionable, whether the injury be to the nerves or to some other
part of the body and regardless of whether the link in the chain of causation
between the wrongful act and the injury to the nerves is physical impact or
fright. The essential thing is the existence of the link in the chain of causation,
not the character of that link."
'In Franklin v. Brown, 118 N. Y. 110, 113, 23 N. E. 126 (1889), Vann, J.,
speaking for the court said: "It is not open to discussion in this state that a
lease, of real property only, contains no implied covenant of this character and
that in the absence of an express covenant, unless there has been fraud, deceit
or wrong-doing on the part of the landlord, the tenant is without remedy even
if the demised premises are unfit for occupation." (Citing Witty v. Matthews,
52 N. X. 512, and Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398.) Twenty-four years later,
in Streep v. Simpson, 80 Misc. 666, 141 N. Y. Supp. 863 (1913), the court,
aware of the pronounced change in living conditions, relaxed the rigor of the
above rule and said: "Co.itions unknown to the ancient common law are thus
created. This requires elasticity in, the application of the principles thereof.
An intolerable condition which the defendant neither causes nor can remedy,
seems to me, warrants the application of the doctrine of constructive eviction."
(Italics ours.)
